Security patterns for LLM integrations including prompt injection defense and hallucination prevention. Use when implementing context separation, validating LLM outputs, or protecting against prompt injection attacks.
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January 25, 2026
Select agents to install to:
npx add-skill https://github.com/yonatangross/skillforge-claude-plugin/blob/main/plugins/ork/skills/llm-safety-patterns/SKILL.md -a claude-code --skill llm-safety-patternsInstallation paths:
.claude/skills/llm-safety-patterns/# LLM Safety Patterns ## The Core Principle > **Identifiers flow AROUND the LLM, not THROUGH it.** > **The LLM sees only content. Attribution happens deterministically.** ## Why This Matters When identifiers appear in prompts, bad things happen: 1. **Hallucination:** LLM invents IDs that don't exist 2. **Confusion:** LLM mixes up which ID belongs where 3. **Injection:** Attacker manipulates IDs via prompt injection 4. **Leakage:** IDs appear in logs, caches, traces 5. **Cross-tenant:** LLM could reference other users' data ## The Architecture ``` ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ │ │ SYSTEM CONTEXT (flows around LLM) │ │ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ │ │ user_id │ tenant_id │ analysis_id │ trace_id │ permissions │ │ │ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ ▼ ▼ │ │ ┌─────────┐ ┌─────────┐ │ │ │ PRE-LLM │ ┌─────────────────────┐ │POST-LLM │ │ │ │ FILTER │──────▶│ LLM │───────────▶│ATTRIBUTE│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ Returns │ │ Sees ONLY: │ │ Adds: │ │ │ │ CONTENT │ │ - content text │ │ - IDs │ │ │ │ (no IDs)│ │ - context text │ │ - refs │ │ │ └─────────┘ │ (NO IDs!) │ └─────────┘ │ │ └─────────────────────┘ │ │ │ └────────────